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such pressure. Great powers are another
matter, since the financial relationships
are more symmetrical. One need only
consider the United Kingdom’s reluctance to limit lucrative financial ties to
Russia in the wake of the Crimea crisis.
Dominant as America is financially,
abuse of that power threatens the dollar’s
special role in global commerce. Zarate
relates an anecdote about an event that
took place in 2003, in which American
officials proposed cyber attacks against
Iraqi assets to penetrate bank computers
around the world covertly and set Iraqi
account balances to “zero.” Treasury
successfully argued that the plan would
shatter confidence and outrage allies, but
the proposal shows that not all leaders
see financial weapons in a nuanced light.
Nations have been slower than “realists” predicted to challenge the U.S.-led
financial order, likely because the system
has not harmed their interests. Freezing out terrorists is one thing, but if the
world perceives the United States as using access to global finance as a reward
for good behavior, the use of other
currencies and development of alternative payment systems will leap ahead.
Zarate writes as a participant and
advocate for the policy of financial
statecraft and for the institution of the
Treasury Department. One should not
treat Zarate’s account as definitive history (diplomats will likely disagree with
Zarate’s harsh take on the State Department), but it is a good, detailed account
of how policy is made and implemented.
The book could be better organized.
It is not quite chronological, not quite
thematic, and sometimes redundant.
The military will wish Zarate had
said more about Treasury and Defense Department cooperation.
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Treasury’s War is a useful contribution, though clearly a participant’s
account and not a scholarly assessment. It will interest those trying to
understand how economic tools can
support national security goals.
DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College

Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2014. 264pp. $29.95

This is an interesting and innovative
look at the course of the Cold War. It is
interesting in large part because Wilson’s
perspective is to look for the unscripted
moments in the course of the conflict—
the occasions when grand strategy, even
policy, did not dictate outcomes. To a
political scientist, this is a refreshing approach. Political scientists and historians
often focus too heavily on patterns, theories, and grand schemes. This volume
is a reminder of the crucial role played
by policy makers struggling to make
up their minds at critical junctures.
Wilson’s book is well informed, looking for moments when leaders took
the initiative, such as when President
Reagan sensed a crisis in Poland in
1981. This work struck this nonspecialist as well documented and particularly well researched on the American
side. One might expect that of Wilson,
who served as a historian for the U.S.
State Department. Deliberations over
nuclear-arms limitations talks receive a
great deal of Wilson’s attention, as one
might expect, and his discussion of the
development of the Strategic Defense
Initiative is particularly engaging.
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However, prospective readers might be
warned that this book would probably
not make good introductory reading to
the Cold War. Wilson takes it as his task
to relate the critical junctures and the
respective leaders’ reasoning at the cost
of communicating the overall history
of the conflict—a reasonable approach,
given the troves of work available on
the period. His portrait of Mikhail
Gorbachev is particularly interesting. He
casts a light on Gorbachev not merely
as a new thinker who offers a different
strategic perspective but as a responder
to American initiatives. Gorbachev
and Reagan shared an abhorrence of
nuclear weapons, sometimes letting
this revulsion outstrip the policies with
which their advisers were comfortable.
Wilson’s portrait of the time is an engaging one, capturing to an unusual extent
how leaders then were trying to understand each other’s motives. “In the last
years of the conflict, improvisation mattered more than any master plan.” We do
well to be reminded of this, since there
is often a temptation to look through
the lens of history and see outcomes as
certain and predictable, which is often
a mistake and the product of psychological bias rather than cold analysis.
Wilson’s book is a useful corrective in
this regard, examining how the role of
improvisation and accident can play critical parts at crucial junctures of history.
ANDREW STIGLER

Naval War College

Willis, Sam. In the Hour of Victory: The Royal
Navy at War in the Age of Nelson. New York: W.
W. Norton, 2013. 416pp. $24
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British author Sam Willis’s latest book,
in what is a fast-growing and impressive collection of naval historical works,
reveals new details of battles previously
immortalized, shining new light on how
these battles were conducted. Willis
titles his book aptly and in a manner appreciative of the primary source
material he has thrust forward from
obscurity. Vice Admiral Collingwood’s
first dispatch to the Admiralty after the
battle of Trafalgar begins, “The ever
to be lamented death of Vice Admiral
Lord Viscount Nelson, who in the late
conflict with the enemy fell in the hour
of victory.” The victorious Collingwood
goes on to describe for his superiors
and for the British public the circumstances that allowed twenty-seven Royal
Navy ships of the line to dominate a
larger combined French and Spanish
fleet. This book analyzes not only the
original dispatches from Trafalgar but
also those from several other great fleet
battles from 1794 to 1806. Specifically,
the author lays out original dispatches,
historical context, and skillful interpretations for the battles of the Glorious
First of June (1794), St. Vincent (1797),
Camperdown (1797), the Nile (1798),
Copenhagen (1801), Trafalgar (1805),
and San Domingo (1806). These giant
fleet engagements were remarkable in
several respects, most notably in that
they marked the last large-scale battles
of the sailing warfare era, and all represent overwhelming British victories.
This work weaves into its narrative
fascinating insights already known to
naval historians. How did Britain come
to dominate all these battles? Numerical
superiority, though normally paramount
in sailing warfare, was not enough to
help the French, Danes, Spanish, or
Dutch during this era whenever a British
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